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‘We’re Internationalists, not Nationalists’: the political ramifications of Welsh 
Labour’s internal power struggle over the ‘One Wales’ coalition in 2007 
 
Abstract 
The bitter arguments within the Labour Party in Wales in 2007 preceding its agreement to enter 
coalition with Plaid Cymru in the National Assembly have faced little substantive analysis, and 
the specific behind-closed-doors debates at the special conference held to vote on the deal have 
remained undisclosed. This paper fulfils both tasks, revealing how actors’ arguments tapped 
into historically resonant traditions in Welsh Labour thought, coalescing around a central 
ideological conflict over the party’s identity vis-à-vis nationalism. The article thus sheds light 
upon Welsh Labour’s internal power struggles at an important juncture in its recent history and 
their continuing ramifications. 
Key Words: Welsh Labour; Plaid Cymru; Welsh nationalism; Devolution; One Wales 
 
Introduction 
The narrow victory for Unionists in the September 2014 Scottish referendum on 
independence, and subsequent Conservative victory in the 2015 General Election, have both 
pushed devolution back to the forefront of British political debate. While media attention 
focuses upon further powers for Scotland and government plans for ‘English Votes for 
English Laws’ at Westminster, less commented upon is the cross-party consensus over the 
devolution of further, extensive powers to the National Assembly for Wales in the 
forthcoming Wales Act.1 What these changes – in Wales, Scotland and seemingly England – 
point to, is a third wave of devolution.  
 
The first wave came with the initial post-devolution elections in 1999, which 
inaugurated a period of Labour-led rule in Wales and Scotland with Liberal Democrat 
support, and (between bouts of direct rule) a ‘moderate’ fronted consociational government in 
Northern Ireland, with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP) as the largest parties. The second wave hit in 2007 when, following the third 
post-devolution elections, Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party ousted the UUP and 
SDLP as the largest parties, and nationalists entered government in Scotland (a minority 
Scottish Nationalist Party government) and Wales (a coalition between Labour and Plaid 
Cymru). It was this second wave that readied the path of the current third wave, the 
2 
 
independence referendum included. The purpose of this article is to help explain one of the 
elements which worked to clear this pathway – specifically, by looking back at the significant 
role of the ‘One Wales’ coalition between the Labour Party and Plaid Cymru in the Welsh 
Assembly, between 2007 and 2011. 
 
The consensus remains that this coalition was not foreseen beforehand. Indeed, in the 
run up to the 2007 elections to the National Assembly for Wales, Peter Hain MP, then 
Secretary of State for Wales, emphatically rejected the possibility of any pact between Welsh 
Labour and Plaid Cymru. He was “ruling it out” and there was “no prospect of that” he 
announced to the House of Commons; “This is a matter for Rhodri Morgan and his fellow 
Welsh Labour AMs” he told MPs, but, nevertheless, he did “not think Welsh Labour would 
allow that”.2 Yet, post-election, with the failure to secure a majority, the prospect of just such 
a pact did arrive, bringing with it a passionate argument within the Labour Party in Wales 
over whether or not they should join a ‘One Wales’ coalition with the nationalists in the 
Assembly.3 This argument and what it can tell us about the nature of Welsh Labour’s internal 
politics at the time and since, and the subsequent direction of politics in Wales, is the focus of 
this paper.  
 
The coalition itself has been the subject of some analysis,4 however, this intra-party 
row has faced little substantive scrutiny5 and beyond a few morsels offered within wider 
discussions,6 the specific behind-closed-doors arguments at the special conference Labour 
held to decide the issue have remained unreported. This paper fulfils both of these tasks, 
placing these deliberations within their correct historical context and analysing the argument 
within Welsh Labour over ‘One Wales’, providing a direct account of the special conference 
debate. Rather than merely reporting the content of these internal debates, however, this 
rhetorical data provides the basis for a discursive analysis aimed at uncovering the intra-party 
ideological power relations within Welsh Labour at a key juncture in the party’s post-
devolution history, and politics in Wales more generally.  
 
Such intra-party power relations are vital for understanding the actions of Welsh 
Labour then and since. Political parties, qua institutions, are discursive constructs, constituted 
by a mixture of formal rules, informal conventions and the (non-formal) interpretations by 
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party actors whose interactions institute the institution itself.7 Included within this mixture is 
a plethora of different, often antagonistic ideological positions and related intra-party 
tendencies.8 This is particularly true of the ‘big tent’ parties that coalesce within majoritarian, 
first past the post electoral systems such as the competition over the UK Parliament – a 
situation accentuated by devolution, whereby these parties must adapt to operate within a 
multi-level system of electoral politics and governance, where coalitions are more likely (due 
to a semi-proportional electoral system). This multi-levelling leads to numerous new 
openings for possible disagreements and their articulation within parties. In this light, far 
from focusing upon outcomes in terms of concrete decisions made (e.g. to enter coalition, or 
not?), ‘[u]nderstanding political parties and their internal dynamics thus necessitates 
recognition of the differential and conflictual aspect of identity creation: the role that 
different ideas – and importantly disagreements and conflicts over ideas – play in intra-party 
relations.’9  
 
The reason that the debate over ‘One Wales’ was a significant moment in Wales’s 
post-devolution history has to do with what it signified for the hegemonic force in Welsh 
politics: the Labour Party in Wales. In Alan Trench’s words, Labour were ‘greatly shocked 
… almost at an existential level’10 by the results of the 2007 election in Wales (as indeed they 
were in Scotland also11). Faced with the alarming possibility of being out of power in Cardiff 
Bay for the first time since devolution, the party was forced to grapple with the very question 
of its identity as both a Welsh and socialist party. This argument and its outcome marked a 
major point of change for the party. According to Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, the 
resulting ‘yes’ vote:  
symbolized a shift in power in the party: from devolution sceptics to supporters of devolution, 
and from Welsh Labour in London to the Labour group in the National Assembly. After 
decades of ambivalence and often-bitter disagreements, it appeared that Wales’s most 
important political force had finally embraced devolution.12 
This analysis of party actors’ rhetoric broadly accepts, but in part also refutes this 
interpretation. It is certainly true that the debate – which split across the party in Westminster, 
Cardiff Bay and the constituency parties – marked the high point of a long-existing division 
within the party.13 What the analysis of antagonists’ rhetoric demonstrates, however, is how, 
while these intra-party arguments did coalesce around a central ideological conflict over 
Labour’s identity, this was not over devolution per se, but rather whether entering the 
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coalition amounted to Labour betraying its socialism and pursuing nationalist, rather than 
internationalist politics. The article thus sheds light upon the power struggles within Welsh 
Labour at an important juncture in the party’s history, arguing that, rather than the moment 
devolution was embraced – an act long past – the final vote and subsequent coalition 
demonstrated the ascendency of a (soft-)nationalist tendency within the Welsh party. Since 
then, moreover, this tendency has become the hegemonic ideology within Welsh Labour, 
shaping the direction of the party’s politics and, as a resultant, the political culture within the 
former Principality more generally. 
 
This article is structured in five parts. Following a brief section outlining the general 
research strategy in terms of theoretical approach and methods of data collection, it first 
sketches a briefs history of the Labour Party in Wales’s antagonistic relationship with the 
Welsh nationalist party with the aim of providing background and context to the subsequent 
analysis. This is followed, second, by the particular circumstances following the 2007 
Assembly elections which led to the ‘One Wales’ deal being debated. The third section 
reports the intra-party argument within Welsh Labour; divided into two sections, it initially 
reports public pronouncements in the pre-conference period, followed by the behind-closed-
doors arguments at the conference itself.  
 
Fourth, the conceptual insights offered by discourse theoretical analysis and rhetorical 
political analysis are drawn together as a means of analysing the differing conceptions of 
(Welsh) Labour and ‘One Wales’ articulated during this internal row. In doing so, it notes 
how, in making their contrasting arguments, party actors were tapping into rich, historically 
resonant seams from the party’s long-developed history of antipathy towards the nationalist 
party. Finally, the fifth part elaborates a set of conclusions, based upon the previous analysis, 
regarding ideological power relations within Welsh Labour then, and the subsequent legacy 
of ‘One Wales’ more than seven years later. 
 
Research Strategy 
This article’s research strategy draws upon a mixed methods approach, applying ethnographic 
research methods, alongside documentary analysis, to collect the data for a discourse 
theoretical analysis. As the latter label signifies, the purpose of this discourse analysis is not 
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to identify the beliefs behind actors’ rhetoric – it is not interested in what people ‘really 
believed’. Rather, aping the perspective of the Essex school of discourse theory, it is 
interested in the affective role of actors’ rhetoric. Specifically, it aims to illuminate, 
analytically, ‘the power strategies’ of actors, engaged in an antagonistic struggle for 
dominance as they attempt to define what Sørensen and Torfing label the ‘regimes of 
practice’ which delimit what is deemed both preferable and feasible within their party’s 
cultural discourse.14 The aim is, thus, not to compare the systems of ideas qua ideas 
operationalised through actors’ rhetoric, but to explore ‘their performative dimensions’.15 In 
practical terms, the interest lies in how, through the process of argumentation, actors 
rhetorically articulate the key concepts under debate in an attempt to make their own, 
particular, conceptual interpretation, accepted as the dominant, universal understanding.  
 
From this, it is subsequently possible to draw a set of inferences regarding the nature 
of the intra-institutional ideological power struggles during this period. Analytically, this 
involves a process whereby, first, the key concepts around which actors’ arguments are 
structured are identified, along with the boundaries of antagonistic inclusion and exclusion 
which their particular articulations create. These, secondly, provide ‘signposts’ to the 
ideological characteristics of the power strategies involved – which is to say the ideology that 
is articulated, which is not the same as identifying individual’s ‘real’ ideology ‘behind’ the 
articulatory practice itself.16 Drawing upon the rhetorical political analysis pioneered by 
Finlayson, Martin and Atkins17 – and in particular, through references to the Aristotelian triad 
of ethos (appeals to the character of the speaker), pathos (to emotion) and logos (to reason) – 
the offensive/defence character, and thus relative positions of power, of those articulating 
these ideological positions can be determined. 
 
Central to this article’s discourse analysis is an account of the debate which took place 
on July 6, 2007, between Welsh Labour members, regarding the decision to enter into the 
‘One Wales’ coalition. This account is based upon the author’s own transcription of the 
debate on the day itself, as an undeclared (non)participant observer, which was taken by 
hand, openly. The parenthetical label ‘(non)participant observer’ is used deliberately to 
emphasise the nuance of the researcher’s position as neither a clearly defined participant or 
nonparticipant observer. As Fetterman describes, a nonparticipant observation could take the 
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form of ‘watching a school basketball team as part of data collection’,18 which, to a large 
degree, matches the situation of the researcher in this case. The author was not present as a 
conference delegate and subsequently could not have spoken in the debate; in this sense the 
transcription of the proceedings can be seen as an example of ‘observation without 
participation’. However, unlike (it can be imagined) Fetterman’s school basketball game, the 
July 6 meeting itself was not a public event, per se, as, although there were no checks or 
physical obstacles to non-members entering the hall, attendance was formally restricted to 
members of the Labour Party in Wales – in which capacity the researcher sat-in to observe. 
While not participating in the debate, therefore, the author could be categorised as a 
participant insofar as they were, formally, a member of the observed ‘group’.  
 
This access also raises questions regarding the ethics of transcribing itself which must 
be considered here. As noted, the recording of the debate was carried out openly and not 
hidden from participants. Nevertheless, this was undeclared ethnographic research and 
questions surrounding ‘covert’ research are a central concern of ethnographers.19 However, as 
Fielding notes with regards to his analysis of the National Front’s internal politics, such 
undeclared research can be justified in settings where group members would be unlikely to 
express their views and feelings openly if the researcher’s role was declared.20 Political 
parties fear reports of internal division and as a members-only meeting, the behind-closed-
doors nature of the special conference undoubtable meant participants felt freer to express 
their views than they would have in a more public setting.  
 
Since the type of discourse analysis undertaken here is interested in how party 
members sought, rhetorically, to convince other party members, it was vital to record how 
members spoke to other members, naturally, which the presence of a declared observer – 
even themselves a member – may have altered. Nevertheless, while the data itself is not of a 
sensitive nature, in recognition that participants spoke with an openness made possible by a 
fraternal audience, to maintain the anonymity of speakers names are omitted, genders 
randomised, and geographic information given only where pertinent to the subsequent 
analysis. Names are only provided when attached to quotations from the pre-conference 
period where were collected through a contemporary review of the Welsh media and from 
subsequent reports in secondary literature. 
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Background & Context 
i) The Labour Party’s historical relationship with Plaid Cymru 
To understand the debate over ‘One Wales’, it helps to have some historical background into 
the antagonistic relationship between Wales’s ‘red and green’21 tendencies – in particular 
Welsh Labour’s relationship, from its own point of view, with the nationalist party, Plaid 
Cymru. As noted by Carwyn Fowler in 2003, ‘[a]t first glance, the extent of the mistrust and 
animosity between Labour and Plaid Cymru seems remarkable’ based on the two parties’ 
‘broadly similar policy platforms’.22 Viewed today, the parties’ outlooks appear closer still. 
Each advocates, at the level of the National Assembly at least, a political programme 
conforming to what has elsewhere been labelled Cardiff Bay’s ‘Welshminster consensus’ – 
i.e. devo-maximising, soft-nationalist, state-welfarist politics.23 Recent authors such as Alan 
Sandry have even disputed the very notion that Plaid Cymru is actually a nationalist party, 
arguing that they are fundamentally a socialist party.24 Why then, was there such controversy 
in 2007? 
 
A number of elements explain the reason why the prospect of a coalition between 
Labour and Plaid Cymru led to such deep disagreement amongst the former’s membership. 
These are (i) the legacy of one-partyism in Wales; (ii) the dominant legacy within the pre-
devolution Wales Labour Party of a centralist, internationalist ideology tendency; (iii) and an 
antipathy to Plaid’s ‘ethnic’ Welsh nationalism, linked to historic charges of fascist 
sympathies in the 1930s and cultural conservatism, due to language ‘extremism’, since. Each 
of these is discussed briefly in order.  
 
Labour’s historic dominance beyond Offa’s Dyke is the first point that helps explain 
the degree of antipathy for Plaid within the party. ‘For much of the twentieth century’, the 
Welsh political historians Kevin Morgan and Geoff Mungham write, ‘it was possible to 
confuse Welsh politics with the politics of the Labour Party in Wales, such was its dominance 
in the political life of the nation.’25 This was a state of one-party politics earnt Wales the 
nickname ‘LabourLand’26 and one of the results of this hegemonic status, as Richard Wyn 
Jones describes, has been a tendency for Labour figures to see opponents not as equal and 
‘indispensable parts of a wider political context’, but rather ‘as enemies to be smashed and 
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obliterated – figuratively if not literally.’27 Even with an electoral system which has made 
coalition government normal, this sentiment has continued – and the question of how to relate 
to Plaid has become a question of identity.  
 
In this context, while Conservatives may be the ‘old enemy’, by standing for different 
class interests, they pose no threat to Labour’s self-identity. Indeed, rather, by providing 
Labour’s ideological opposite, they structurally function as the party’s ‘constitutive 
outside’.28 Thus, in 2007, Labour’s Assembly election campaign broadcast was a video 
entitled ‘Wales under the Tories’ which presented to viewers a sequence setting-out some of 
the detrimental effects previous Conservative governments had on Wales – a negative 
campaign whose fundamental message was ‘We are not the Tories: Vote for us.’  
 
 By contrast, the claim by Plaid that they, not Labour, offered the real voice of the 
Welsh, is experienced as an affront to Labour’s self-identity as the party representing Wales 
to the world. The name Plaid Cymru literally translates as ‘the party of Wales’ in English. 
The perceived insolence of this claim was and is taken as an affront by a certain Labour 
sensibility, not easily dismissed. This attitude was clearly displayed in the Labour Party’s 
reaction to Plaid Cymru’s successes in the first post-devolution Assembly elections in 1999. 
Plaid’s impressive electoral showing then was the cause of deep resentment in Welsh Labour, 
not only because they deprived the party of an Assembly majority it expected by ‘historical 
right’, but also due to nationalists’ capture of traditional Labour strongholds the Rhondda, 
Llanelli and Neil Kinnock’s former constituency Islwyn.29 Faced with these shock loses, so 
the story goes, an emotional Peter Hain telephoned the Prime Minister to relay the hitherto 
unthinkable message: “Tony, I’ve lost the Rhondda!”30 The Labour Party in Wales’s decision 
in 2000 to formally rebrand itself the full-blooded ‘Welsh Labour Party: the True Party of 
Wales’ points to the trauma of the previous year.31 
 
The second reason for Labour antagonism towards Plaid has to do with the former’s 
ideological legacy in Wales. This also links back to the party’s dominance there, in particular 
in the post-war period that had a lasting impact on the party’s psyche. As Kenneth O. Morgan 
puts it, the years between 1939 and 1951 were, for Wales, ‘a period of reform, yet also social 
and cultural conservatism. Labour’s victory was for the old values. It was based on the 
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communal solidarity of the pit and the choir and the co-op and the Workers’ Educational 
Association, transmitted from the industrial valleys throughout significant areas of the Welsh-
speaking north and west as well.’ In this form, post-war Wales has offered both a folk 
memory of what it meant for Labour to be in power and established an ethos attached to 
Labour politics based on ‘people’s power, solidarity, a collective response, central planning, 
a welfare democracy and social citizenship’.32 Of these, central planning and social 
citizenship were key elements that pitted Labour against Plaid Cymru. 
 
The dominant, if not universal sentiment attached to this ethos was anti-nationalist in 
nature. Indeed, for a Labour Party in Wales dominated by the National Union of 
Mineworkers, nationalism was viewed as fundamentally at odds with the nationalisation as a 
form of economic centralism, synonymous with the south Welsh coal and steel industry, and 
the correlative idea of cross-border, worker solidarity. Few individuals are claimed to 
encapsulate this ideological sentiment as was Aneurin ‘Nye’ Bevan, son of a coal miner, MP 
for Tredegar and founder of the NHS. His most famous intervention on this subject was in the 
1944 Welsh day debate, whence he argued that ‘Wales has a special place, a special 
individuality, a special culture and special claims’, but that there was ‘no special solution for 
the Welsh coal industry which is not the solution for the whole mining industry for Great 
Britain.’ It was here that he deployed one of the subsequently most quoted phrases in the 
debate over Welsh political identity:  
‘There are sheep on the Welsh mountains, and there are sheep on the mountains of 
Westmorland and in Scotland, but I do not know the difference between a Welsh sheep, a 
Westmorland sheep and a Scottish sheep.’33  
In reality, Bevan’s ‘antipathy to Welshness can be overdone’.34 While Smith argues that 
‘[t]he question of Wales, per se, was not one to which he gave much thought in isolation’35, 
Robert Griffiths describes it as, rather, something with which Bevan ‘never fully came to 
terms’.36 The ambiguity in Bevan’s thought was demonstrated perfectly in his 1947 statement 
on ‘The Claim of Wales’ wherein he both declared that Wales ‘has a claim for special 
recognition’ in areas of language, art and culture, education ‘and an excitement for things of 
the mind and spirit, which are wholly different from England and English ways’ and that 
questions of policy affecting industrial and agricultural policy affected ‘the rest of the country 
as well as Wales and can be settled only by decisions which embrace all’.37 
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Bevan was not alone in the latter sentiment. It found expression at the time and after in 
the arguments of Welsh Labour MPs such as Ness Evans, George Thomas, Leo Abse and 
Neil Kinnock, who made up what has been called the ‘materialist’ wing of the Labour Party 
in Wales, for whom matters of perceived cross-border, industrial commonalities took 
precedence over cultural differences.38 Thus, Evans attacked ‘those who are nationalists first 
and Socialists second’39 and Abse channelled Bevan when he declared “a steelworker is a 
steelworker, whether he works in Ebbw Vale, Llanwern, Scunthorpe or Sheffield and ... a 
fibre worker is a fibre worker, whether he works in Pontypool or Harrogate”.40 It was 
Kinnock who most effectively articulated this ideological tendency’s message when, in 1975, 
he told the House of Commons: 
“I believe that the emancipation of the class that I have come to this House to represent, 
unapologetically, can best be achieved in a single nation and in a single economic unit, by 
which I mean a unit where we can have a brotherhood of all nations and have the combined 
strength of working-class people throughout the whole of the United Kingdom brought to bear 
against any bully ... [The working class’s] misfortunes are not the result of being British, Welsh 
or Scottish. They have come about because their fate has been, in the system of economic 
organisation or disorganisation that we have had hitherto, to be workers…”41 
This resolutely inter-nationalist position, which saw nationalism as a threat to working-class 
solidarity and central planning, was the dominant force within the Labour Party in Wales well 
into the early 1990s, and as such within Welsh politics in general. It was also key in delaying 
and blocking devolution of powers to Wales. 
 
This is not to say alternative voices and tendencies did not exist with Welsh Labour. 
Alongside this ‘materialist’, Unionist tendency was another, elsewhere described as a 
nationalist or Welsh tendency.42 This distinct tradition within the party saw purpose in 
reconciling international socialism with elements of cultural and governmental nationalism. 
This included influential figures such as Huw T. Edwards,43 and Welsh Labour MPs Cledwyn 
Hughes, John Morris and (in some regards) Jim Griffiths MP. The sentiment was most clearly 
expressed, however, in Keir Hardie’s message to his Merthyr constituents in 1908, to “[h]ave 
the Red Dragon of Wales, but have it blazoned on the Red Flag of international socialism.”44 
Where the Unionists emphasised centralism and warned against separatism, their opposites 
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advocated devolution. Yet, while some such as Edwards would make the transition from the 
Labour Party to Plaid Cymru, others such as Griffiths would mix their support for greater 
Welsh autonomy within the Union with a still strong antipathy for Plaid; indeed, in the 1950s 
Griffiths went so far as to attack a Plaid Cymru candidate for sympathising with ‘Nazi 
ideology’.45 This tapped into another aspect of the antipathy within Labour for the Welsh 
nationalists. 
 
What both of these ideological traditions within the Welsh Labour Movement share is 
an internationalist politics. This has proved another point of friction between Labour and 
Plaid, rubbing up against some of the early politics both articulated by and ascribed to leading 
Welsh nationalists. At a time when miners from the south Wales valleys were joining the 
international brigade, for example, Plaid’s newspaper adopted a position, described by 
Kenneth O. Morgan, as one which ‘leaned towards Franco in the Spanish Civil War’,46 while 
W. Ambose Bebb, who founded Plaid in 1925 alongside Saunders Lewis, professed his 
support for Mussolini, even going so far as to declare that ‘Mussolini influences the 
Nationalist Party in Wales. He influences every well-read and thinking man’47. Come 
Britain’s formal entry into war with fascism in 1939, Lewis also declared his opposition to 
the conflict by alleging a moral equivalence between the British Empire and Axis powers. 
Kenneth O. Morgan’s opinion that Lewis ‘sailed close to the wind in his enthusiasm for 
totalitarian regimes of the right’48 is one widely held today. 
 
In his book The Fascist Party in Wales, Richard Wyn Jones has worked to demonstrate 
the genuine unfairness of claims linking Plaid and fascism.49 These accusations left deep, 
easily referenced marks upon the party, and subsequently entered the collective memory as a 
dirty period in Plaid’s history. As political labels go, fascist is understandably toxic, and the 
claim that Plaid Cymru was founded by individuals expressing such sympathies tarred the 
party’s reputation within Labour circles. As late as 1998, Labour MP Kim Howells 
(Pontypridd), when asked about the left-wing credentials of Plaid, responded: ‘I’m never sure 
that nationalism has got anything to do with socialism. I keep putting the words together and 
coming up with Hitler.’50 
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The fascist claim is likely to have had particular resonance due to the ‘ethnic’ rather 
than ‘civic’ nationalism51 that has underpinned Plaid Cymru’s political agenda. This has 
primarily to do with the protection and promotion (even assertion) of the Welsh Language, 
which key figures such as Saunders Lewis were happy to declare ‘more important’ than self-
government.52 This image of Plaid as a party whose fundamental role is to advocate for the 
Welsh language has led to charges of cultural conservatism and political extremism – the 
latter due to the direct action taken by Welsh nationalists inside and outside of Plaid in their 
campaigns against the language’s decline, especially in the 1960s-70s.53  
 
Plaid thus gained a reputation among critics as an ‘anti-English’ party (both of the 
people and language), with concern among some Labour Party members in South Wales in 
particular that their politics represented ‘a concerted attempt by a Welsh speaking middle 
class elite to change the nature of Welsh society and politics to their advantage and to the 
disadvantage of the monoglot English speaking majority.’54 Such sentiments were articulated 
by George Thomas (Labour MP and future Viscount Tonypandy) when he attacked ‘the anti-
English sentiment always beneath the surface in Welsh-speaking areas’ which nationalists 
represented.55 Whatever the level of truth, these assertions had a negative effect upon how 
significant sections of the majority English speaking population came to view Plaid. Their 
influence can still be seen in comments such as those made in 2002 by Labour MP Wayne 
David (Caerphilly), who declared there to be a ‘strong strand of racism and xenophobia in 
Plaid Cymru’s history.’56 
 
These above factors play significant roles in constructing a generally negative narrative 
within the Welsh Labour Party regarding the history of its nationalist adversaries in Wales. 
The claim that Labour was the party of Wales and the working class, while Plaid was a party 
that rejected internationalism, was tarred by fascism and militant in its campaigns around the 
Welsh language, provided fertile ground for distaste to grow. This is not to claim the 
authenticity of these three narrative elements, nor that they each have had an equal weight to 
them, or that these weights have not changed over time. Yet, grasping these elements as part 
of a Welsh Labour discourse is important to understand why it is that the debates of 2007 
were so contentious; that is to say, why the decision to enter into coalition with another 
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centre-left party led to such rancour within the ranks. But how did this question even come 
about? 
 
i) The 2007 Negotiations 
Between 1999 and 2007, the Labour Party governed in the National Assembly for Wales 
either in coalition with the Liberal Democrats (2000-2003) or as a single party, be that a 
minority (1999-2000) or majority (2003 to 2007) government. In 2007, however, Labour, 
failed to retain a majority of seats in the May 4th Assembly election. The party won twenty 
six seats and Plaid won fifteen, making them the second biggest party. The Conservatives 
won twelve seats, the Liberal Democrats six, and one independent. As a result, Labour was 
forced to enter negotiations with its opponents to stay in power. Initially, most commentators 
expected these negotiations to result in a Lab-Lib coalition as had previously existed between 
2000 and 2003. This was also, reportedly, the option preferred by the majority of Welsh 
Labour AMs and MPs.57 Rhodri Morgan AM, leader of the Labour group in the Assembly, 
thus seemingly expressed the party’s post-election feelings when he described the options 
Labour was faced with in choosing between governing with Plaid Cymru, or the Liberal 
Democrats, as one between the ‘inedible’ and merely ‘unpalatable’.58 
 
The prospect of a Lab-Lib deal was scuppered, however, when on May 17th the Welsh 
Liberal Democrat executive voted to suspend talks with Labour. Five days later Plaid’s 
Assembly Group also suspended parallel negotiations on a lesser ‘stability pact’ wherein they 
would have held no seats in a Labour cabinet. Instead, both parties signalled their support for 
an alternative ‘Rainbow Coalition’ between themselves and the Conservatives.59 The Labour 
Party thus found itself faced with the possibility that it could end up out of power in Wales 
for the first time. This threat itself collapsed, however, when, the following day, a split vote 
by the Welsh Liberal Democrats executive on the ‘Rainbow’ deal meant that no 
recommendation could go forward for a vote at a party special conference.  
 
During the period it took the Liberal Democrats to rectify this result and pass such a 
recommendation, Rhodri Morgan was chosen as First Minister of a minority Labour 
government in the Assembly. Subsequently, as a result of their evident ‘internal divisions and 
differing forms of disorganisation’,60 the other parties’ leaderships deemed the Liberal 
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Democrats untrustworthy coalition partners and both the ‘Rainbow’ moment and possibility 
of a Labour-Liberal Democrats coalition were widely viewed to have passed.61 Over the 
following month, therefore, talks resumed between the Labour and Plaid Assembly Groups, 
resulting in the ‘One Wales’ document, setting out the basis for coalition. Key points of this 
agreement included: an unqualified commitment to a referendum on primary powers for the 
Assembly, at or before the 2011 Welsh elections, which the Labour Party would campaign in 
favour of; a convention focused upon the case for further powers leading up to the 
referendum; an independent commission reviewing the Barnett formula; a commitment to 
consider devolving criminal justice powers to Wales; and a new Welsh Language Act.62 In 
response to the proposals Labour subsequently announced a special conference would be held 
July 6th where the party would discuss and vote upon signing-up to ‘One Wales’. 
 
Both in the run-up to, and at the conference itself, a passionate debate raged within 
Welsh Labour over whether or not the party should agree to the ‘One Wales’ coalition deal. 
While much of the argument, by the nature of party politicking, took place informally, out of 
sight within the party,63 a significant amount took place out in the open. The importance 
members attached to the subject was thus demonstrated through their willingness to shake 
any illusion of party unity, not least with the tone adopted by senior figures within both the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and Assembly Group. With the background and context to this 
debate set out, the subsequent section details the content of the arguments themselves. 
 
The Argument Pre-Conference 
 
In a pre-conference letter published in the Western Mail, Kim Howells MP wrote that: ‘It 
may be that many, or some, of Labour’s AMs agree with significant elements of the Plaid 
Cymru agenda and that they see no difficulty or danger in a much more powerful set of 
administrative functions for the Assembly...’.64 ‘[T]here are’, Howells stated, ‘Labour AMs 
who are comfortable’ with adopting such policies as the devolution of tax raising/fixing 
powers, criminal justice and a ‘review’ of the Barnett formula65 – policies he derided as 
‘aspirations ... of course, at the heart of the nationalist agenda.’ Were such a path to be taken, 
Howells asserted, it ‘will lead ultimately to separation and independence’. His letter 
concluded that it was ‘ironic that the very same party that for so long held at bay the 
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separatists and cultural and political nationalists is prepared now to provide for their former 
enemies an Assembly vehicle that transports those same nationalists to the gates of 
independence.’ 
 
In the same vein, fellow MP Don Touhig declared himself ‘totally opposed to sharing 
power with Plaid in the assembly’ because Labour ‘have nothing in common with a 
nationalist separatist party and I think it would be wholly wrong’.66 Entering the coalition, he 
said, would be ‘suicide for Labour’ and ‘walking into a trap.’ Touhig also echoed Howells in 
arguing that ‘One Wales’ was ‘pushing a nationalist agenda, not a Labour agenda’: ‘The 
nationalists want independence and all the things in this document accelerate that. Plaid gets 
more in this document than they have managed to secure in the last 50 years’.67 Cllr. Robert 
Bevan, a Labour cabinet member of Rhondda Cynon Taf Council, echoed this view in the 
Western Mail, writing: ‘Like many others, I have spent years fighting against the nationalists, 
whose philosophy I consider to be wholly alien to me as a socialist. I would rather Labour 
went into opposition than do any deal with them’.68 
 
Lynn Neagel AM also argued against the deal. ‘One of the many fears harboured by 
those of us in the Labour party who oppose the One Wales document’, she stated, ‘centres on 
where this coalition is taking us long term – as a party and as a country’.69 Fellow Labour 
AMs, Karen Sinclair, Ann Jones and Irene James, releasing a joint statement further arguing 
against the deal, on the basis that ‘The lack of any binding common philosophy between the 
two parties coupled with the different aspirations we have for the future of Wales would... 
make it very difficult for the coalition to withstand the rigours of a four-year assembly 
term’.70 They disagreed, they continued, with ‘the Plaid Cymru-inspired policies included in 
the agreement’, describing the commitment to campaign for a referendum on further powers 
‘even before the current new powers have had a chance to bed down’ as ‘undeliverable’. 
‘One Wales’, they claimed, would lead to the relegation of socialist politics, with ‘the focus 
being taken away from the real social justice issues that the people of Wales clearly want us 
to concern ourselves with over the next four years’.71 Touhig levelled the same criticism, 
declaring: ‘Most of it does not touch on the bread and butter issues I am interested in like 
jobs, the economy and tackling crime. It's all constitutional stuff that does not affect or 
interest my constituents’.72 
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Supporters of ‘One Wales’ argued back, also through the Welsh media. Speaking to 
BBC Radio Wales, Rhodri Morgan stated that he understood ‘the very strong emotions 
involved’, but hoped opponents would ‘see this as a historic opportunity to deliver Labour’s 
manifesto’.73 As a proposition, he argued, coalition was ‘really’ about one question: ‘In order 
to deliver 100 per cent of Labour's manifesto, what part of another party's manifesto do we 
have to swallow …?’ – a manifesto Morgan seemingly no longer deemed ‘inedible’. Now he 
claimed that he thought: 
… most people on the Labour side realise that if Labour is the senior partner in a coalition and 
Plaid is the junior partner, that is very much better for Wales and for the delivery of Labour's 
manifesto than having Plaid as the head of the coalition with Tory ministers in the middle of it 
and Liberal Democrats supporting it as well, which is the alternative. 
Edwina Hart AM, Minister for Health in the Assembly, also vocalised support for ‘One 
Wales’, declaring: 
I think we’ve got to recognise that this is grown-up politics we have in Wales. This settlement 
was never going to produce a majority every time. It’s taken us a long time to get here – we’ll 
be lucky if once in every 25 years a party gets a majority. It’s about parties of similar ideas 
working together, and we’ve got to grow up.74 
Further support for the deal came from Andy Richards, head of the Welsh branch of the 
Transport and General Workers Union who - referring to the opposition voiced by Howells, 
Touhig, etc. – publically denounced ‘activities in sections of the parliamentary group ... 
which are singularly unhelpful at this time’, declaring that MP’s ‘self-interest must give way 
to democracy’.75 
 
From within the party-in-the-media, Professor Kevin Morgan also expressed support, 
telling the Western Mail: ‘I, for one, welcome the prospect of the two great progressive forces 
in Welsh politics coming together’,76 attributing opposition to the deal to a ‘British’ element 
within Labour: 
For many years, there have been internal divisions in Labour between what might be called 
British Labour and Welsh Labour. Devolution has forced this division all the more into the 
open. … There are those in the party who are viscerally opposed to any kind of link with Plaid 
Cymru. 
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Attacking the latter, he called for an end to the situation whereby, ‘[f]or too long in Wales, 
people have been stuck in their silos indulging in a kind of antediluvian juvenile politics that 
passes for mature politics’.77 
 
The Argument at the Special Conference 
 
This internal party debate continued, equally as vociferously, at the conference itself. Given 
the chance to speak from a party sanctioned podium, behind closed doors at the Cardiff 
International Arena, many members forcefully attacked the deal. One party member told the 
room they had ‘been blackmailed into supporting a nationalist agenda,’ a view later echoed in 
one AM’s declaration that ‘the crazy nationalist odyssey’ – the phrase, as they noted, Labour 
used to describe Plaid’s policies during the recent election – ‘is contained within this 
document’.78 A different AM warned that ‘the politics of social justice is in danger of being 
replaced with the politics of identity’, while a member of the Women’s Forum called upon 
conference to ‘vote for your socialist principles, not for nationalist principles’; another 
delegate appealed to members to ‘remember, we are socialists not nationalists!’ 
 
 ‘Comrades’, an MP and former Minister declared, ‘I have nothing in common with 
that party [Plaid] and I do not want to join them on ‘a journey’, as this document says on the 
first page! That shows a perverse pride for this.’ They were followed by a Constituency 
Labour Party (CLP) delegate who castigated supporters, declaring ‘the party I joined is an 
internationalist one, not a nationalist one’ – a message later repeated by an MP’s declaration 
they were opposed to ‘One Wales’ because ‘I’m not a nationalist, I’m an internationalist’. 
Plaid, another delegate announced, had ‘successfully soured their socialism with the politics 
of nationalism.’ 
 
Adopting a different tact, some north Walian voices claimed southern members 
fundamentally misunderstood Plaid. The aforementioned Women’s Forum member, for 
example, from a northern CLP, argued: ‘They [Plaid] are not the cuddly group you think they 
are down here in the south,’ claiming that ‘in north Wales, English speakers are second class 
citizens’ and explaining that ‘we [northern opponents] want to stop Wales becoming a greater 
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Gwynedd’. The same point was made by a north-west CLP delegate who declared ‘south 
Wales comrades don’t seem to recognise the party we’re talking about’, labelling Plaid 
‘racist’ and warning it was ‘not alright to negotiate with a party because only part of it seems 
racist!’ 
 
A sense of frustration and powerlessness was evident in such members’ arguments: 
one MP representing a northern seat claimed he had ‘warned Welsh Labour in 1998’ about 
the dangers of Plaid, but ‘they labelled them a fringe north West party’; only when Plaid won 
southern seats did the leadership ‘come to take them seriously.’ The Women’s Forum 
member also claimed: ‘We have told you this before. You have not been listening to us, and 
this document shows that.’ ‘One Wales’, she told conference, was ‘a betrayal too far’ and 
northern opponents such as herself, whilst ‘activists’, were ‘not going to campaign for this!’ 
An MP representing a south Wales valley seat also signalled his unwillingness to campaign 
on the contents of ‘One Wales’, declaring it right to want ‘to hold onto power, but not at any 
price’. 
 
Opening their remarks in Cymraeg before switching to English (‘I think I’ve made the 
point…’ they told the room), another MP warned that entering coalition would prove an 
‘escalator’ to power for Plaid since Labour would be constantly battling against a ‘Welsh 
media ... stuffed full of Plaid’s friends’. A different MP reiterated this message, warning that 
‘the BBC and Western Mail will aid and abet the nationalists.’ Describing nationalists as a 
‘cultural elite’, one opposing AM urged the conference ‘to hear the cry of the silent majority 
of members who reject this document’, while another declared Welsh Labour would ‘be tied 
to the nationalist mast [in coalition] as the nationalists constantly threaten to jump ship to the 
Tories’. Opponents also attacked the affiliated trade unions, a delegate lashing out at some 
uses of their bloc vote: ‘I have a one member one vote democratic mandate from my CLP, 
unlike the unions’ he told the conference – to some booing from the crowd – complaining 
that, as a member of the TGWU, ‘no one has approached me and asked my opinion.’ An AM 
struck out in the same manner, declaring himself ‘disappointed by my union, UNISON, who 
have not sought my vote.’  
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Speaking to both cheers and laughter from the conference, an MP loudly declared 
‘One Wales’ to be ‘a Trotskyist plot!’, claiming (to only partially ironic cheers): ‘Seriously, 
these are transitional demands. I’m not saying Plaid are Trots – well, some of them probably 
are – but this is transitional demands [sic] and Plaid will take all the glory!’ As well as 
warning about extra-party machinations, the MP also turned his sights inwards. There were, 
he continued: ‘certain elements within this party who want to deliver this [a nationalist 
agenda], and if people won’t say it, then I will. We’ve already seen people calling for 
[devolved powers over] criminal justice today. And if you want this, then go to it [i.e. join 
Plaid]!’  
 
In terms of actual Plaid members, one particular figure was referred to throughout 
conference – not an AM, but Adam Price MP. In the run up to the conference Price had 
written a blog post describing ‘One Wales’, in Gramscian terms, as an ‘‘epochal’ not merely 
‘conjunctural’’ choice within a wider ‘war of position’ by Plaid.79 Price’s words were taken 
up by opponents and reproduced on leaflets distributed at the conference opposing the deal. 
Titled ‘Don’t help Plaid wreck our Party’, these leaflets argued that Price’s blog-post, ‘lays 
bare the real truth behind Plaid’s claims. They are using this deal to drive a stake through 
Labour’s hearts, electorally and politically. Plaid sees this coalition as the latest victory on the 
road to becoming the natural party of Government in Wales.’ Referring to this blog post, an 
AM further warned: ‘Adam Price actually said this would be their greatest victory in pushing 
our party towards independence by stealth.’  
 
Altogether, roughly three quarters of speakers at the conference did so against the 
deal. However, while fewer spoke, supporters of coalition also argued their case from the 
podium. One delegate declared her CLP was ‘overwhelmingly in support’ of the deal because 
it allowed ‘delivery’ of Labour’s programme and Labour ‘owe it to the people of Wales to 
stay in power’. Other southern CLP delegates, as well as an MP (with low ministerial 
responsibilities), echoed this, the latter declaring his support on the grounds that ‘I want as a 
minister to be dealing with Welsh Labour ministers’, warning members against 
‘revolutionary defeatism.’ 
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Morgan’s previous portrayal of ‘One Wales’ as – policy wise – a continuation of 
Labour’s manifesto was re-voiced at the conference. Speaking prior to the card vote, a Welsh 
Labour leadership figure reminded members that a referendum on ‘further powers’ for the 
Assembly was already Labour policy and a manifesto pledge in the last election; only ‘the 
timing’ was different and ‘what Plaid have asked for, is to implement Labour policy a bit 
early … that’s hardly a big deal to die in the ditch for is it?’ Concluding their speech, they 
declared ‘we’ve all carried the placards and worn the t-shirts’ but now it was time ‘to 
govern’. 
 
This basic message was repeated on a second leaflet distributed at the conference in 
support of the deal. Produced by the party machinery in Cardiff’s Transport House, its 
argument was set out as a scripted Q&A exchange. One asked: ‘Does it change our position 
on powers for the Assembly that we agreed at our Special Conference in 2004?’ 
Unsurprisingly, it answered ‘No’: 
What the document contains is a commitment to holding a referendum in this Assembly term, 
following successful tests of public opinion and following the establishment of a Constitutional 
Convention. This will bring forward a piece of legislation that already exists and that was 
introduced by our Labour Government at Westminster through the Government of Wales Act. 
The leaflet also addressed the question of whether other Labour policies would be lost, again 
answering ‘No’: ‘Eradicating child poverty and the policies associated with it are all in place. 
The same is the case for the extra funding for the Wales Union Learning fund, the Union 
Modernisation Fund and funding for more modern apprenticeships.’ Accepting the coalition 
was necessary it argued, ‘if we wanted to have the opportunity to implement our manifesto 
commitments and to protect programmemes like Communities First and the free breakfast 
scheme’. ‘One Wales’, the message went, was the necessary price for a strategic goal: ‘it [is] 
best to be inside government, having the opportunity to lead and shape events and policies, 
rather than being on the outside as a party of protest’. 
 
More than should, supporters also declared Labour must accept ‘One Wales’. The 
party was ‘placed in the position’ of having to accept it, one MP declared, by ‘a terrible 
failure of [the LibDem] leadership’; another MP declared that the first Welsh Labour 
administration (of which they had been a leading member) showed minority government 
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‘doesn’t work’,6 blaming the ‘ramshackle electoral arrangement’ for forcing coalition upon 
the party. The idea that a Labour-Plaid coalition was necessary due to the electoral system 
was also raised by a representative of Labour Students, and a member of Labour’s leadership 
team, the latter stating: ‘We’re not used to the effect of proportional representation’, but that 
‘probably in three out of four elections we’re going to go through this process.’  
 
Finally, supporters claimed the deal would not fundamentally affect Welsh Labour: 
‘One Wales’, a member of the party leadership argued, was an agreement between two 
Assembly groups, just as between two groups on a council, and would not limit ‘vigorous 
political action’ in areas outside the coalition’s remit; Labour would attack Plaid ‘at all 
elections’ they promised. The language of unity was also voiced by another leadership figure 
who finished their speech by repeating a phrase previously used by opponents of the 
coalition: ‘We’re not nationalists and we never will be’ they asserted, ‘we’re 
internationalists.’ Nevertheless, though their rhetoric may have overlapped in this one 
statement, as the following section demonstrates, in their arguments over ‘One Wales’, 
opponents and supporters of the coalition articulated fundamentally different conceptions of 
the party’s identity and what the deal would mean for it. 
 
Rhetorical analysis and intra-party power relations 
 
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of this article is not only to delineate the hitherto 
unreported argument within Welsh Labour preceding the ‘One Wales’ coalition, but to use 
this as a means of gaining analytical purchase upon power-relations within the party at this 
point in time. Approaching the subject in this manner then, what do the arguments which 
played out around ‘One Wales’ indicate about ideological power relations within Welsh 
Labour in 2007? 
 
i) Opponents’ Rhetoric 
First, an analysis of party actors’ rhetoric finds two key lines of argument articulated by those 
opposed to ‘the coalition deal: (i) the relationship between Labour and Plaid was 
irreconcilably antagonistic on ideological grounds precluding coalition between the parties; 
and (ii) instituting ‘One Wales’ would consequently be an ‘elitist’ betrayal of Labour and its’ 
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‘people’. Rejecting coalition with Plaid was thus not just preferable to alternatives, but 
should be a shibboleth for Labour. 
  
The first part of the message – ineradicable antagonism – was articulated via such 
rhetoric as Councillor Bevan’s description of Plaid’s philosophy as ‘alien’, Touhig’s 
declaration that he had ‘nothing in common’ with Plaid, and the AMs’ claim there was a 
‘lack of any binding common philosophy’ and ‘different aspirations’. Howell’s claim that 
coalition would inevitably mean a nationalist programme did the same. During the 
conference, moreover, by stating ‘One Wales’ contained ‘the crazy nationalist odyssey’, 
pushing a ‘nationalist agenda’, opponents portrayed Labour and Plaid as directly in conflict, 
between the former’s ‘socialist principles’ and the latter’s nationalism (‘we are 
socialists/internationalists not nationalists’); Plaid was an un-acceptable entity (‘racist’) 
which would contaminate (‘sour’) Labour’s socialism. This tapped into that section of the 
Labour narrative which sees Plaid Cymru as an institution with historical roots in support for 
fascism and a culturally conservative ‘ethnic’ agenda – in opposition to Labour’s own 
internationalist history. 
 
The depth of this antagonistic relationship was also articulated via metaphors based 
around images of war and conflict; thus, Howells described Labour having ‘held at bay’ 
nationalist ‘enemies’, Bevan of years ‘fighting against the nationalists’. Touhig’s description 
of ‘One Wales’ as ‘a trap’ also evoked a militaristic warning. Conceptualised thus – as a 
partisan relationship, not of mere difference, but fundamental antagonism – assertions like 
Bevan’s that he would ‘rather go into opposition’ make sense: better to die fighting than lay 
down arms and capitulate. 
 
The second part of the message, linked to this sense of capitulation, emphasised 
betrayal – specifically elite betrayal. For example, both Touhig’s comments and the AMs’ 
statement painted the deal as elitist by contrasting it with what the ‘people of Wales’ ‘clearly 
want’ and for allegedly relegating ‘bread and butter’ issues that ‘interest ... constituents’ in 
favour of cultural and constitutional ‘stuff’ which does not. While not directly stated, such 
anti-elitist rhetoric actually, counterintuitively, played into Labour’s legacy as the hegemonic 
party in Wales. This was due to the linked narrative of Labour as the true voice of the people 
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of Wales (both in terms of the Welsh people as a whole and the working class people of 
Wales in particular). It also tapped into conceptions of Plaid as a middle-class elite 
representing Welsh language interests.   
 
This linkage was expanded and developed by northern opponents’ attacks upon 
southern supporters (i.e. the Cardiff Bay based leadership) for not realising the Welsh 
nationalists’ ‘true nature’ (a party of ‘racists’), linking this to a portrayal of ‘activists’ (i.e. the 
grassroots) on the ‘frontline’ against nationalism (the north particularly), being ignored by a 
distanced (southern) elite that included Plaid’s Welsh media ‘friends’ and ‘undemocratic’ 
trade union bosses. The latter were also traduced via portrayals of ‘One Wales’ as part of a 
‘plot’ by nationalists (both outside Labour – as with Adam Price – or, like the ‘Trotskyite 
entryists’ supporting his ‘alien’ ideology, within) to turn Labour into a nationalist party, 
betraying its socialism, deemed the historical politics of the Welsh people. In contrast to this, 
the ‘cry of the silent majority from within the party’ was invoked in direct challenge to the 
‘cultural elite’ supporting ‘One Wales’.  
 
Such emotionally laden, pathos heavy rhetoric made extensive appeals to the ethos  of 
those opposing ‘One Wales’, linking their fight to the protection of the party’s values and 
contrasting this with the low morals of supporters. Opponents’ appeals to logos were 
grounded in the overarching argument that, socialism and nationalism being ideologically 
antithetical, logically a deal between Labour and Plaid was also.80 This differed extensively 
from the arguments made by supporters of the deal. 
 
ii) Supporters’ Rhetoric 
Rhetorically, supporters of ‘One Wales’ relied far less upon pathos laden appeals to 
sentiment; instead, their arguments referenced opponents’ ‘very strong emotions’ as part of a 
wider argumentative appeal to logos and ethos that emphasised the rationality of their case by 
arguing that, for a party of government, coalition was the only way to implement party 
policy. Opponents’ passionate espousal of their position was thus turned into an attack by 
supporters upon the former’s ethos due to a lack of logos. Thus, in her call for the party to 
‘grow up’ and embrace ‘grown-up politics’, Hart insinuated that opposition to ‘One Wales’ 
was based on outdated and childish reasons – temper tantrums even – a view echoed in Kevin 
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Morgan’s portrayal of opponents’ ‘visceral’ position and ‘antediluvian juvenile politics that 
passes for mature politics’, and Andy Richard’s claim opposition from MPs was merely ‘self-
interest’.81 Framing opponents’ position as a refusal to accept the reality of the electoral 
‘settlement’, Hart’s argument also framed the coalition as the logical position while arguably 
painting opponents as stuck in the past (and with outdated views of the party’s history). 
Opposition was thus ‘revolutionary defeatism’ and not the behaviour of rational actors; a 
theme also evident in claims Labour needed to move on from ‘placards and t-shirts’ to 
‘govern’. 
 
The second element was to reject the basic logic of opponents’ case by refuting the 
notion that rejecting ‘One Wales’ was axiomatic because socialism and nationalism are either 
irreconcilable, or reconcilable only as National Socialism. Rhodri Morgan thus emphasised 
policy-overlap, the deal providing ‘100 per cent of Labour’s manifesto’ and ‘better … for the 
delivery of Labour's manifesto’ as, far from ideological betrayal, ‘One Wales’ merely 
implemented Labour policies ‘a bit early’. Similarly, Hart declared the possible partners were 
‘parties of similar ideas’ while Kevin Morgan described them as, together, ‘the two great 
progressive forces in Welsh politics’. Underlying this was the message that coalition would 
not alter Labour; even accepting ‘One Wales’ Labour would not be nationalists: ‘and we 
never will be, we’re internationalists’.  
 
Together, this message emphasised a responsibility by Welsh Labour to enter power 
and the necessity of not splitting the Labour governments in Westminster and Cardiff. 
Labour, after all, is by self-regard the party of power in Wales. As such, this was a matter of 
ethos, more than logos, as it played to the need ‘to protect programmes’, and implement a 
manifesto which supported Labour’s voters (as Nye Bevan, for example, would have 
wished…). Identification by Kevin Morgan and Richards of certain party elements as 
impediments to implementing these policies (i.e. ‘British Labour’/the ‘parliamentary party’) 
even framed such internal elements as more ideologically distanced from Welsh Labour 
politics – and the legacy of working class solidarity which came with it – than ‘progressives’ 
in Plaid. In so far as the party at Westminster was implementing a ‘Blair-ite’ neo-liberal 
agenda while Plaid Cymru advocated social democratic policies, claims that the latter were 
actually more Bevanite than the former had teeth; the charge of a historic betrayal was thus 
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turned back against opponents. What then can this tell us about the ideological state of the 
Welsh Labour Party in 2007 and its subsequent direction? 
 
Analytical Conclusions 
Speaking before the card vote at the special conference, one member of the party leadership 
described that day’s debate as ‘a very good test of what sort of party we want to be’, this 
being one ‘that will not fall apart’ and a ‘family’ that, ‘no matter how much we fight’, stays 
together. Another leadership figure echoed this message, telling members: ‘To start, lets 
knock on the head the self-important professor in the Western Mail [Kevin Morgan] … who 
claims there are two parties, one in London and one in Cardiff. We are one Labour Party and 
always will be, standing together.’ The party, they declared, ‘was divided as a Welsh Labour 
Party because of predicament’ alone, and that ‘what unites is immeasurably greater than the 
divisions’.  
 
The resulting conference vote itself seemingly demonstrated such assertions of cross-
party unit were a reality; a resounding victory for coalition supporters, ‘One Wales’ won a 
clear majority of both affiliates (96%) and constituencies (61%), passing with 78% of the 
collated vote.82 For all the debate, this outcome had in fact been a known from the outset, the 
affiliate and CLP votes having already been counted; what the conference had allowed, 
however, was an opportunity for the losing side to vent. Recognition of this leads to the 
question of what this particularly bitter debate (this venting), as analysed above, can tell us 
about the power relations within Welsh Labour behind the ultimate result of this vote. 
 
Two facts point to the intra-party argument over ‘One Wales’ as more than a one-off 
policy spat, but rather symptomatic of a wider ideological division between different 
tendencies within the party. First, its linkage by both sides to the fundamental nature of the 
party itself, its ideology and values, and the manner in which each tapped into historical 
trends within Welsh Labour thinking. Secondly, the consistency of the different elements 
across the two deeply antagonistic positions articulated by the different sides’ rhetoric. What 
was the nature of this deep, intra-party divide? The previously referenced claim by Jones and 
Scully83 that the argument over ‘One Wales’ was between supporters and opponents of 
devolution lacks subtlety on two points.  
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First, confusing support for ‘One Wales’ with supporting and embracing devolution, 
is to equate a Labour aversion to Plaid Cymru with a rejection of devolution. There are 
historical presidents for this claim, as some of Plaid’s harshest critics within Labour were 
also anti-devolutionists (Evans, Thomas, etc.); but others, such as Jim Griffiths, were both 
anti-nationalists and pro-devolutionists, demonstrating the dangers of equating the two. The 
debate within Labour was, rather, to do with the party’s subsequent political identity if it 
entered coalition. The key division each side articulated was related to ideology rather than 
policy (or at least, where it was against specific policies it was due to claims of their 
ideological nature). Specifically, both defined Labour’s ideology as socialist; however, while 
one articulated this ideology as the antithesis of nationalism, the other accepted they were 
different, but not un-reconcilably. The fundamental antagonism which characterised the 
argument over ‘One Wales’ was thus not about devolution or about accepting coalitions, but 
about nationalism, and accepting coalitions with nationalists. The problem for opponents was 
articulated as Plaid itself – and anti-nationalist is not the same as ‘devo-sceptic’. The 
argument was about whether accepting ‘One Wales’ would mean Labour was no longer an 
internationalist, but rather a nationalist party – and as such tapped into deeper narratives 
within the party of both Labour and Plaid Cymru’s respective histories. 
 
Second, as the debate reported above shows, portrayals of the argument of ‘One 
Wales’ as one between Cardiff Bay and London is pernicious: MPs, AMs, councillors, and 
CLP delegates argued across both sides of the debate. Nevertheless, the formal divisions do 
offer lessons: Ultimately, the coalition was (i) supported by the Party nomenclature and 
political leadership in Westminster, Cardiff Bay, Transport House and affiliates; and (ii) 
debate aside, ‘One Wales’ accrued the overwhelming majority of votes in the special 
electoral college. As such, supporters of the coalition without question dominant the formal 
structures of the party.  
 
Actors’ arguments also expressed these power-relations: Opponents were clearly on 
the back-foot, striking an insurgency pose of ‘the people’ versus elites with appeals to pathos 
and ethos – playing up values and ideals related to the party’s glorious past, rather than 
offering logical solutions to a problem in the here-and-now. Opponents had a clear, loud 
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voice in the post-election debate; theirs was, however, an argument against the position 
advocated by those with formal power (aka ‘the elite’). Supporters, by contrast, demonstrated 
their dominance within the party via their rhetoric of reasonableness, the need for pragmatism 
and maturity. Such appeals to logos, tied to a governing party ethos (as the historic party of 
Welsh government), were possible as those making them already occupied the position most 
members perceived as the post-devolution political ‘reality’. If opponents spoke-up more than 
supporters during the debate this was a sign not of strength but weakness; one side was more 
confident it would carry the day regardless of the argument itself. While opponents claimed 
the ideological high ground, they nevertheless failed to win the majority of grassroots votes 
in the CLPs and (some) affiliates when put to the vote. The view that nationalism was 
antithetical to Labour politics, once a significant force within the party’s narrative, ultimately 
lacked weight; those who saw accommodation (the ‘red dragon on the red flag’) as an 
acceptable part of a Labour-led coalition government were in control.  
 
Overall, the ‘One Wales’ debate marked the first and so far last time, post-devolution, 
that a major ideological conflict has broken out in Welsh Labour. Eight years after the loud 
and bitter arguments set out here, there are currently no clear voices from within Labour that 
dispute the cross-party consensus in Welsh politics supporting the devolution of the same 
powers to Wales as to post-referendum Scotland.84 Yet, as this analysis has sought to 
demonstrate, this conflict and subsequent acceptance of a red-green coalition did not signify a 
shift within the party from an anti-devolutionary tendency to a pro-devolution one. The fact 
that opponents articulated their problem as the nationalists, not devolution, indicates that the 
ideological dominance of the latter was already a reality. 
 
Rather, it marked the solidification of a (soft-)nationalist ideological predisposition 
within the Welsh Labour leadership and wider party; the debate in 2007 can thus be seen as 
the key moment when Welsh Labour become a ‘One Wales’ party. This has remained the 
hegemonic position within the party since the coalition ended in 2011 and subsequently 
Welsh politics in general. 85 Indeed, in the 2011 Assembly elections Labour won 50 per cent 
of the seats and formed a functioning one-party government. Plaid Cymru, by contrast, fell to 
third place behind the Conservatives – one explanation for this fact is that, through its 
adoption of clear devo-maximising programme framed in soft-nationalist rhetoric, Labour has 
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both ‘spiked Plaid’s guns’ and through its dominant position, shifted the centre of political 
gravity onto this same ground which they can now control.86  
The electoral benefits of this position for Welsh Labour may not be as clear cut as 
they appeared in 2011, however. Thus, while Labour topped the polls in Wales at the 2015 
General Election, and Plaid Cymru were relegated to fourth in the share of the vote, the 
party’s overall performance was poor, securing only 25 seats – one fewer than in 2010. The 
Conservatives, by comparison, won three, achieving their best result since 1983. 
Furthermore, Welsh Labour faces a threat from a different nationalism, UKIP coming second 
place behind them in six seats and a close third in a number of others, eating into their 
majorities.87 Faced with these significant threats from the right, rather than the left, the 2016 
Assembly elections thus heralds a key test for the ‘One Wales’ Welsh Labour approach. 
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